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Abstract
Moral perceptions of harm and fairness are instrumental in guiding how an individual navigates moral challenges. Classic research
documents that the gender of a target can affect how people deploy these perceptions of harm and fairness. Across multiple
studies, we explore the effect of an individual’s moral orientations (their considerations of harm and justice) and a target’s gender
on altruistic behavior. Results reveal that a target’s gender can bias one’s readiness to engage in harmful actions and that a
decider’s considerations of harm—but not fairness concerns—modulate costly altruism. Together, these data illustrate that
moral choices are conditional on the social nature of the moral dyad: Even under the same moral constraints, a target’s gender and
a decider’s gender can shift an individual’s choice to be more or less altruistic, suggesting that gender bias and harm considerations
play a significant role in moral cognition.
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Introduction
A culturally pervasive social norm is the chivalrous idea that
women should be protected from harm. This is exemplified
by ‘‘women and children first’’—a historical maritime code
of conduct stating that when there is a life-threatening situation,
those who are more vulnerable should be saved first (Kipling,
1907). Dovetailing with this, classic research on gender stereo-
typing demonstrates that both implicit judgments (Banaji &
Hardin, 1996a) and explicit actions (Eagly & Crowley, 1986;
Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman,
2012) are affected by gender bias—that is, associating males
with strength and power and females with nurturance and help-
lessness. This reliance on using a target’s features to infer over-
arching personality traits (Asch, 1946) has proven to be
powerful in influencing one’s judgments (Hamilton & Sher-
man, 1996; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977) and even behavior
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
From this work, theorists have further posited that a target’s
features may affect endorsements of harm violation (Gray,
Waytz, & Young, 2012), which fits with the evidence that
harming behavior in particular is susceptible to shifting social
cues that signal distinct morally appropriate behavior. Research
exploring the interaction between harming and helping demon-
strates that how readily an individual harms another appears to
be a function of the social context in which the harm is
embedded. For example, features that make harm perceptually
salient decrease the likelihood of engaging in harmful beha-
vior. This has been observed in various classes of moral
dilemmas and with different manipulations, including pushing
a person onto train tracks versus pulling a lever to reroute the
train (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen,
2001), showing more versus less skin when administering elec-
tric shocks (Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, Bloom, & Barrett, 2011),
observing someone’s face rather than just their hand
respond to pain (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, Evans, & Mobbs,
2015), and discharging a toy gun into another’s face versus
witnessing such an action occurring (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey,
& Mendes, 2012).
Even after the harm has occurred, social context can further
influence how one engages with a distressed target. For
instance, a target’s identity is known to effect the level of sym-
pathy or punishment that is bestowed (Cikara, Bruneau, &
Saxe, 2011; Gray &Wegner, 2009), and how a person responds
to a target’s pain is moderated by their relationship with the dis-
tressed individual (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011). Given
how robustly social context can dictate harm perception, a lin-
gering question is whether a target’s gender contributes to the
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social framework of a moral dilemma, and thus the willingness
to harm another. If this were the case, a target’s gender—and
the social biases that associate males with strength and females
with helplessness—may modulate the endorsement of harm,
resulting in divergent altruistic behavior. In other words, these
gender biases may influence females receiving greater chival-
rous treatment (i.e., more protection from harm at the expense
of self-gain) than their male counterparts. To test this, under
both real and hypothetical contexts, and across different classes
of moral dilemmas, we first explore whether a target’s gender
influences the propensity to harm another.
We also wanted to investigate possible psychological
mechanisms motivating an individual to harm another for
self-gain. There is evidence that distinct patterns of moral judg-
ments result from varying sensitivities to fairness and harm
concerns (Haidt & Graham, 2007b). These two orientations are
considered to be the most dominant foundations for moral
decision-making, each capturing distinct perspectives: treat
others fairly and help others in need (Gilligan & Attanucci,
1988). Theorists argue that individuals navigate moral chal-
lenges either by relying predominately on their sensitivity to
harm and care considerations or through a well-developed cal-
culus sensitive to justice and fairness concerns (Gilligan, 1982;
Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). A wealth of research now highlights
that humans are highly attuned to both fairness (Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999) and harm considerations (Cushman et al.,
2012; Greene et al., 2009). Based on the literature, we were
agnostic as to whether altruistic motivations would be better
explained by the general tendency to endorse harm and care
considerations or fairness and justice considerations. Thus, our
second aim was to examine how a target’s gender and an indi-
vidual’s considerations of harm and fairness interact to influ-
ence costly altruism—that is, helping or harming another at a
cost to oneself.
To ask these questions, we probed behavior in two different
types of moral dilemmas. First, we tested whether a target’s
gender would have an effect on responses in the classic Trolley
Dilemma (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1976; Studies 1A and 1B),
hypothesizing that if a target’s gender is instrumental for fram-
ing a moral scenario and shaping perceptions of harm, then
even under hypothetical conditions where one must simulate
the tensions, individuals should more readily agree to push a
man—compared to a woman—in front of the trolley. In Study
2, we explored the effects of a target’s gender on moral beha-
vior during real dyadic interactions between an intentional
decider and a distressed target (Gray, Young, & Waytz,
2012). This dyadic paradigm—known as the Pain versus Gain
(PvG) task (FeldmanHall et al., 2012)—requires participants to
make decisions about how much money they would pay to
reduce or prevent painful electric shocks from reaching a target
(a confederate). This allowed us to test if participants exhibit
differential patterns of altruistic behavior based on the target’s
gender (i.e., paying more money to prevent harm from reaching
a female compared to a male target). If gender and the accom-
panying biases—such as associating females with helpless-
ness—contribute to the social framing of a moral dilemma,
then participants who engage with a female target may display
greater prosocial tendencies (i.e., more money paid out and less
pain administered). Drawing on the classic work of Kohlberg
and Gilligan (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977) as well
as the rich literature on moral trade-offs (Tetlock, Kristel,
Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) and sacred values (Graham &
Haidt, 2011), we further theorized that any observed differ-
ences in moral behavior would likely be a function of the inter-
action between a target’s gender and a participant’s individual
trait differences in harm and fairness sensitivity. More specifi-
cally, increasing altruistic tendencies toward females may be
related to how strongly participants identify with and value
harm or fairness concepts.
Studies 1A and 1B
Participants
In Study 1A, 50 participants (20 females, mean age 32.5, SD+
11.2) were recruited from the United States using the online
labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser,
2011; Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis,
2010). In Study 1B, 152 participants (78 females, mean age
37.1, SD + 11.9) were recruited through AMT. Participants
participated anonymously over the Internet and were not
allowed to take part in more than one experimental session. All
participants provided written informed consent, and the study
was approved by Columbia University’s ethics committee.
Method
Participants in Study 1A were presented with the classic variant
of the Trolley Dilemma, the Footbridge Dilemma (Foot, 1978),
and queried whether they would push a male or female bystan-
der onto the tracks. Participants in Study 1B were randomly
selected to read one of the three versions of the dilemma, where
each vignette described a man, woman, or gender-neutral
bystander on the bridge. The participant was then asked how
willing they were to ‘‘push the [man/woman/person] onto the
path of the oncoming trolley,’’ indicating on a 10-point analo-
gue scale willingness to push (WTP). The aim was to determine
whether there are observable gender biases during philosophical
moral dilemmas, with the key variable being how readily a male
or female bystander is pushed onto the tracks (i.e., harmed).
Results and Discussion
In Study 1A, 88% of participants reported that they would push
the man off the footbridge (Pearson’s w2¼ 28.88, 1 df, p < .001,
Z2 ¼ .57; Figure 1A), illustrating that participants significantly
endorsed the preservation of a female over a male bystander’s
welfare. Adding in participant’s gender as a factor revealed no
significant effect ( p > .6). During debriefing, participants sug-
gested possible motivations for their responses explaining that
‘‘in a utilitarian situation, I value women and children over
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men’’ and ‘‘[pushing] a man is the moral thing to do, women
are fragile and it would be morally wrong.’’
In Study 1B, we manipulated gender and again explored par-
ticipants’ WTP. We submitted WTP to a 3 (bystander gender)
 2 (participant gender) analysis of variance (ANOVA), where
variables were coded as follows:1¼ female, 0¼ unspecified
gender, 1 ¼ male. Results revealed a main effect of the bystan-
der’s gender, F(2,146) ¼ 3.8, p ¼ .02, Z2 ¼ .05 (Figure 1B),
such that participants were overall more willing to push a man
(meanWTP¼ 3.3, SD+ 2.4, 10¼ very willing) or a bystander
with an unspecified gender (mean WTP ¼ 4.3, SD+ 3.1) than
a woman (mean WTP ¼ 3.0, SD + 2.4). We also observed a
main effect of the participant’s gender, such that female parti-
cipants were overall less willing to push (mean WTP¼ 3.2, SD
+ 2.5) than male participants (mean WTP ¼ 4.0, SD + 2.9;
F(1,146) ¼ 6.4, p ¼ .01, Z2 ¼ .04), which dovetails with pre-
vious research illustrating women are more sensitive to causing
harm then men (Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015). The
Bystander  Participant interaction did not survive signifi-
cance (p > .1).
Together, this reveals that participants were less willing to
push a woman than a man off the footbridge, suggesting that
even within the hypothetical domain where the tensions are not
as easily simulated (FeldmanHall et al., 2012), individuals take
a target’s gender into account when contemplating harmful
actions. We further observed that female participants were
overall less willing to harm another, replicating previous work
that not only are males sacrificed more often than females in
classic trolley dilemmas but also that females are less likely
to harm others (Eckel & Grossman, 2001; Skulmowski, Bunge,
Kaspar, & Pipa, 2014).
Study 2
Participants
In Study 2, 57 adults were recruited from the UK Medical
Research Council Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit volunteer
panel (32 females; mean age 25.21, SD + 4.83); sample size
was based on previous similar work (FeldmanHall et al.,
2012). In order to avoid priming moral attitudes and to minimize
explicit moral reasoning during task performance, we recruited
participants under the pretense of participating in an economic
decision-making study. All participants provided written
informed consent, and the study was approved by Cambridge
University’s Psychology Research Ethics Committee. An inde-
pendent group (n ¼ 50; 24 males; mean age 36.1 years, SD+
14.06) rated the attractiveness, approachability, and feelings
toward both targets, finding that the male was significantly more
attractive, approachable, and positive than the female target (all
ps < .001, see Supplemental Material for details).
Method
In the PvG task, participants (deciders) were presented with a
series of 20 trials, each requiring a moral decision: benefit one-
self financially or prevent harm to another. At the start of the
experiment, deciders were given £20 and told that any money
left at the end of the task would be multiplied up to 10-fold,
giving them as much as £200. On each trial, £1 was at stake,
and the choice was how much, if any, of the £1 to give up in
order to prevent a painful but harmless electric shock from
reaching the target on that trial. The more money paid out on
a given trial, the lower the shock level inflicted on the target
Figure 1. Behavior in footbridge dilemma. (A) When faced with either pushing a male or female bystander, participants overwhelmingly choose
to sacrifice a male bystander. (B) A main effect of willingness to push was observed illustrating greatest willingness to push a bystander whose
gender was not identified and least for a female bystander. A main effect of participant’s gender on willingness to push was also observed, with
female participants less willing to push compared to male participants.
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(index of costly altruism): Paying the full £1 would remove the
shock altogether, while paying nothing would mean the target
experienced the highest shock level on that trial. The key beha-
vioral variable was how much money (£0–£20) deciders
retained across the 20 trials, with larger amounts indicating that
personal gain was prioritized over the target’s pain. Effectively,
the more money the decider paid, the lower the shock level the
target received on a given trial. Consequently, to stop all of the
shocks across all 20 trials, deciders would need to spend all £20
(see Supplemental Material for full task details).
Deciders were also required to view the administration of
the shocks. This allowed us to manipulate the target’s gender
by broadcasting a video of either a male target (Condition 1)
or female target (Condition 2) responding to the shock
(Figure 2A; we used this between-group design to control for
the possibility of demand characteristics). Since the shocks
were real, videos were prerated by an independent group to
be matched across condition, such that both male and female
targets elicited similar body and facial pain expressions that
were directly yoked to the analogue scale presented to partici-
pants. To ensure that other potential factors besides a target’s
gender were not driving behavior, we checked (using 8-point
Likert-type scales in a subset of our participants during
postexperimental questionnaires) that targets were matched
on multiple dimensions including their familiarity, all indepen-
dent t-tests: t(44) ¼ 1.2, p ¼ .234; similarity, t(44) ¼ 0.403,
p ¼ .689; likeability, t(44) ¼ 0.563, p ¼ .577; and political
orientations, t(44) ¼ 0.007, p ¼ .995.
Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (MFSS)
To explore potential moderating effects of harm and fairness
considerations, we administered the MFSS (Graham & Haidt,
2011) after the PvG, which provides an index of the willingness
to earn money at the expense of multiple moral considerations.
The MFSS proposes that there are certain psychological foun-
dations on which individuals build their moral systems and are
organized along five dimensions (Graham & Haidt, 2011).
Since the harm and fairness scales are believed to be most rel-
evant to everyday life (Haidt & Graham, 2007a), and because
there is a long-standing debate over which of these two dimen-
sions best predicts moral behavior (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg &
Figure 2. (A) Experimental design with schematic images of the two conditions—male and female targets—that participants observed during
the video feed. (B) Participants kept significantly less money when interacting with a female target than a male target, t(55)¼3.16, p¼ .003. (C)
The relationship between money kept (an index of selfish behavior) and the target’s gender as a function of trait harm sensitivity. (D) The
relationship between money kept and a decider’s gender as a function of trait harm sensitivity. Variables were standardized before being entered
into the regression. Regressions were graphed using the method of simple slopes (Aiken & West, 1991), where high harm sensitivity ¼ 1 SD
above the mean; low harm sensitivity ¼ 1 SD below the mean. Error bars represent 1 SE.
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Hersh, 1977), we used these constructs as predictors of costly
altruism. The scale measures how much money an individual
is willing to receive to violate moral norms within each of the
foundations (see Supplemental Material for more details),
encapsulating whether or not a person is motivated (at the
expense of money) to care for someone (harm) or is willing
to immorally profit off others (fairness).
Results
During the PvG task, deciders interacting with a female target
kept significantly less money and thus gave significantly lower
shocks (n¼ 34; £8.76/£20, SD+ 5.0) than deciders interacting
with a male target, n¼ 23; £12.54/£20, SD+ 3.9; independent
samples t-test: t(55) ¼ 3.16, p ¼ .003, Cohen’s d ¼ .82; Fig-
ure 2B. This replicates the findings from Studies 1A and 1B in
the real domain and under a different class of moral challenge,
illustrating that harm endorsement is attenuated for female tar-
gets. Together, this suggests that a target’s gender can power-
fully shift the perception of harm and lead to an increase in
costly altruism (see Supplemental Material for further analysis
including the influence of the decider’s gender on money kept
as well as results of Study 4 replicating these findings in an
online version of the PvG task).
Exploring deciders’ trait sensitivity to harm and fairness
considerations (Graham & Haidt, 2011) revealed that female
deciders reported significantly greater sensitivity to harm than
male deciders, female mean harm sensitivity¼ 30.4, SD+ 5.1,
male mean harm sensitivity ¼ 26.2, SD+ 5.8; independent t-
test: t(55) ¼ 2.88, p ¼ 0.02, Cohen’s d ¼ .77. We did not
observe a difference in deciders’ trait fairness levels, female
mean fairness sensitivity¼ 25.0, SD+ 9.7, male mean fairness
sensitivity ¼ 27.1, SD+ 7.9; independent t-test: t(55) ¼ 0.89,
p¼ 0.38. To examine whether these individual trait differences
in moral orientations moderate the relationship between altru-
ism and a target’s and decider’s gender, we performed multiple
regression analyses (Table 1). Money kept/shock delivered
(index of costly altruism) was the dependent variable. The
predictors at the first step (Model 1) were target’s gender,
decider’s gender, and deciders’ individual trait harm scores (all
z-scored). At the second step (Model 2), we entered each of the
product terms of these variables, and at the third step (Model
3), we entered the three-way interaction term. Significant mod-
eration is indicated by the fit of the model improving with each
subsequent step (Aiken & West, 1991). We also ran this same
regression with deciders’ fairness scores.
We found a significant moderating role of harm sensitivity
on both the effects of a target’s gender and a decider’s gender
on altruistic behavior, Model 2: DF(3, 50) ¼ 4.59, p ¼ .006,
Dr2¼ .15, r2¼ total .46; Table 1. Figure 2C and 2D plots these
significant interactions using the method of simple slopes
(Aiken & West, 1991). We found that higher levels of trait
harm sensitivity predicted greater altruism for female targets
but not male targets (Figure 2C). That is, deciders high in harm
sensitivity interacting with a female target kept significantly
less money, thus preserving the female target’s physical wel-
fare. We also found that trait levels of harm sensitivity played
a moderating role on a decider’s gender and their subsequent
choice to preserve the welfare of the target: Male deciders with
low levels of trait harm sensitivity were significantly more self-
ish than males deciders with high levels of trait harm sensitivity
(Figure 2D). This finding did not hold for female deciders, as
females exhibited the same altruistic behavior regardless of
their levels of trait harm sensitivity. Furthermore, there was
no clear interaction relationship between an decider’s gender,
a target’s gender, and trait harm sensitivity, Model 3:
DF(1, 49) ¼ 0.08, p ¼ .78, Dr2 ¼ .001, r2 ¼ total .46; Table 1.
While we found that fairness considerations influenced
altruistic choice overall, Model 1: DF(3, 52) ¼ 7.71,
p < .001, Dr2 ¼ .31, r2 ¼ total .27, we observed no evidence
that fairness considerations had a moderating role on gender
and altruistic choice, Model 2: DF(3, 49) ¼ 2.1, p ¼ .11,
Dr2 ¼ .08, r2 ¼ total .31. Together, these results demonstrate
a strong relationship between a decider’s sensitivity to harm
considerations and the target’s gender on altruistic choice as
well as a strong relationship between a decider’s gender and
their sensitivity to harm on altruistic choice.
Studies 3A, 3B, and 3C
Given that we observed a target’s gender can bias one’s readi-
ness to engage in harmful actions and that a decider’s
Table 1. Multiple Hierarchal Regression Study 2.
Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
B SE B b B SE B b B SE B b
Harm 1.67 .61 .34** 1.55 .56 .31** 1.56 .57 .36*
Decider gender (DG) 0.76 .61 .15 0.75 .56 .15 0.74 .56 .15
Target’s gender (TG) 2.04 .57 .41** 1.87 .52 .38** 1.81 .58 .36*
Harm  DG 1.31 .56 .25* 1.32 .57 .25*
Harm  TG 1.16 .57 .23* 1.17 .58 .24*
TG  DG 0.46 .58 .09 0.48 .59 .09
Harm  TG  DG 0.16 .58 .03
R2 .31 .46 .46
F for DR2 8.03** 4.60* 0.07
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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considerations of harm—but not fairness concerns—modulate
costly altruism, we next sought to explore possible motivations
supporting this gender and harm interaction. One explanation is
that females typically evoke more positive attitudes than males
(Fazio & Olson, 2003) and are thus more likely to reap greater
prosocial treatment. However, our post-task questionnaires
probing attitudes toward the target significantly favored the
male target, indicating that positive feelings for females are
unlikely to be underlying the observed effect. An alternative
explanation is rooted in the interaction between harm endorse-
ment and adherence to societal norms, with the idea that it is
more socially unacceptable to harm a female than a male
(Becker & Wright, 2011; Crew, 1991; Viki, Abrams, & Hutch-
ison, 2003; Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2009). There is also the pos-
sibility that individuals find it more emotionally aversive to
harm a female, which in turn could enhance altruistic behavior
in the PvG task (Cushman et al., 2012; Miller, Hannikainen, &
Cushman, 2014; Pizarro, 2000). In the next studies, we probe
whether these motivations might underlie an individual’s reluc-
tance to harm a female target for monetary gain.
Participants and Methods
A total of 352 participants were recruited for Studies 3A–3C,
see Supplemental Material for details. Study 3A was a hypothe-
tical analogue of the PvG task—where target’s gender was ran-
domly manipulated to be female, male, or gender neutral (a
between-subject design). Participants were queried about how
much money most volunteers would keep and probed about
societal perceptions of (1) harm, (2) pain tolerance, and (3) the
chivalrous notion that men should protect women. Study 3B
presented a subset of the same questions in Study 3A, except
that questions pertained to both males and females (a within-
subjects design). Study 3C randomly presented one of the three
versions of the hypothetical PvG, and probed emotional aver-
sion to the dilemma. See Supplemental Material for full list
of questions and descriptive statistics from analyses in Studies
3A–3C; answers were recorded on 10-point Likert-type scales.
Results
When probed about what other volunteers would do in the
hypothetical analogue of the PvG, participants in Study 3A
reported most volunteers would keep significantly less money
when engaging with a female than a male or gender-neutral tar-
get, ANOVA: F(2, 148)¼ 3.8, p¼ .024, Z2¼ .05. Societal per-
ceptions of pain tolerance revealed that women are believed to
have a significantly lower pain tolerance than either men or a
person whose gender was unspecified, ANOVA: F(2, 148) ¼
10.2, p < .001, Z2¼ .12. A similar pattern was observed regard-
ing commonly held social norms that dictate how fair it is to
harm a (man/woman/person); harming females was perceived
as significantly more unfair than harming either a man or a
gender-neutral person, ANOVA: F(2, 148) ¼ 7.28, p ¼ .001,
Z2 ¼ .09.
When queried about who should be saved first on a sinking
ship, only one participant reported that men should be saved
first (Pearson’s w2¼ 78.3, 2 df, p < .001, Z2¼ .52), and the rest
of participants responded that there should either be no order or
that women should be saved first (Figure 3A). Finally, partici-
pants reported that society generally subscribes to the
Figure 3. Societal norms motivating harm endorsement. (A) Participants reported there should be either no order for who is saved first on a
sinking ship or that women should be saved first. (B) It is more unacceptable and (C) unfair to harm a woman than a man. (D) Men are perceived
to have higher pain tolerances than women.
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chivalrous notion that men should lend more protection from
harm to women than men, t(150) ¼ 4.3, p < .001, Cohen’s
d ¼ .70.
Study 3B confirmed these findings in a within-subject
design. Specifically, we observed that according to social
norms, it is significantly (1) more morally unacceptable
to harm a female for money, paired samples t-test: t(49) ¼
2.6, p ¼ .01, Cohen’s d ¼ .37: Figure 3B; (2) more unfair
to harm a female, paired samples t-test: t(49) ¼ 5.03,
p < .001, Cohen’s d ¼ .34: Figure 3C; and men have a signif-
icantly greater tolerance to pain, paired samples t-test: t(49) ¼
4.1, p < .001, Cohen’s d ¼ .98: Figure 3D.
In Study 3C, we tested whether harm inflicted on males and
females elicits different levels of emotional aversion. Partici-
pants responded to three questions relating to their own emo-
tional aversion and level of emotional intensity after reading
the hypothetical PvG scenario. Across conditions (male/
female/gender neutral), we found no differences in the level of
emotional aversion or level of emotional intensity (all ps > .1).
That is, participants reported similar high levels of emotional
aversion to reading about a male, female, and gender-neutral
target in the PvG dilemma (see Supplemental Material for
details).
Across these three studies, we investigate possible motiva-
tions supporting the finding that a target’s gender can bias an
individual’s willingness to engage in harmful actions. The find-
ings suggest that social norms regarding gender and harm con-
siderations likely account for greater harming behavior toward
a male than a female target. Moreover, there are widely held
societal perceptions that females are less tolerant to pain, that
it is unacceptable to harm females for personal gain, and that
society endorses chivalrous behavior. Surprisingly, we found
no differences in emotional aversion to reading about harming
males versus females. These findings confirm perceptions of
gender bias, and that these biases interact with harm considera-
tions, helping to disambiguate why males are harmed more dur-
ing the PvG task. While it is equally emotionally aversive to
hurt any individual—regardless of their gender—that society
perceives harming women as more morally unacceptable, sug-
gests that gender bias and harm considerations play a large role
in shaping moral action.
General Discussion
Here we illustrate that across different types of moral dilem-
mas, and under both hypothetical and real contexts, moral
choices to harm another are conditional on the social nature
of the moral dyad and are thus relatively context dependent.
Specifically, we show that moral behavior is modulated by the
gender of the target individual, such that females are more
readily protected from harm and are more often the recipients
of costly altruism compared to their male counterparts. When
asked to respond to a utilitarian-based moral dilemma, partici-
pants overwhelming responded that they would push a man—
rather than a woman—in front of an oncoming trolley. When
we tested this effect in a different class of moral challenge
where self-benefit and another’s welfare are juxtaposed, we
found that even under the same moral constraints where all
components of the moral task were held constant, a target’s
gender can shift an individual’s choice to be more or less
altruistic, providing converging evidence that gender bias plays
a significant role in moral behavior.
Research demonstrates that increasing the salience of harm
has profound effects on moral behavior (Cushman et al., 2012;
Greene et al., 2001), and the data presented here illustrate that
the gender of the target is a critical feature that can shift the
endorsement of harm and influence the altruistic response. One
explanation for this is that beliefs about female and male char-
acteristics bias how an individual perceives harming a target.
Most people have widely shared beliefs and expectations about
the traits and behaviors of males and females (i.e., Social Role
Theory; Eagly, 1987). Males are typically associated with traits
like aggression and dominance (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012;
Sheltzer & Smith, 2014), and females are characteristically
associated with traits such as nurturance and submission (Bro-
verman, Vogel, Broverma, Clarkson, & Rosenkra, 1972; Cejka
& Eagly, 1999; Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001). These
beliefs are easily and automatically activated (Banaji & Hardin,
1996b). For instance, individuals who were preconsciously
primed with stereotypic characteristics like ‘‘sensitive’’ and
‘‘logical’’ (for female and male, respectively) were faster at
identifying the gender of male or female names (Blair &
Banaji, 1996). If females are canonically construed as sensitive
and needing nurturance, then inflicting harm on a stereotypi-
cally weak target may be perceived as more salient and aver-
sive than harming a target associated with strength and
competence.
An alternative explanation suggests that people feel more
positively about women than they do about men (Eagly,
1994). Our data, however, indicate that the male target was
rated as more attractive, approachable, and positive compared
to the female target. Thus, it seems unlikely that positive feel-
ings for the female target influenced costly altruism. In fact, in
light of the research linking attractiveness to increased helping
(Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976), our findings that the
female was helped more—despite being rated as less attractive
and approachable—further supports and heightens the
observed effect.
Regardless of an individual’s attractiveness and approach-
ability, it is well documented that attitudes are shaped by impli-
cit and explicit biases stemming from widespread cultural
stereotypes about gender (Eagly, 1987, 1997; Eagly & Mladi-
nic, 1989; Foschi, 2000; Goldin & Rouse, 2000; Nosek, Banaji,
& Greenwald, 2002). Evidence of gender typical behaviors,
such as females greater involvement in care-taking and com-
munal behaviors, and males in more agentic and competitive
behaviors (Gardner & Gabriel, 2004), illustrates that these atti-
tudes can shape how males and females behave, including their
engagement in prosocial behavior (Eagly, 2009). Although
much more limited, some research has explored the other side
of the social dyad; that is, whether gender stereotypes act as
social norms influencing how targets are treated (Wood &
548 Social Psychological and Personality Science 7(6)
Eagly, 2009). For example, women typically receive more help
than their male counterparts (Eagly & Crowley, 1986), and in
the Dictator game—where one can choose to forgo money in
order to be fair—female players are allocated more money than
male players (Saad & Gill, 2001). That we found that a target’s
gender can also shape costly altruism, dovetails not only with
male and female stereotypical characteristics, but also the
notion that these gender biases have downstream effects on
behavior. Indeed, we found there is a societally held notion that
moral chivalry governs how morally unacceptable it is to harm
a female. Social norms regarding pain tolerance and the notion
that women should be protected from harm further confirmed
that there is a societal belief that it is more morally unaccepta-
ble to harm a female than a male. Together, this suggests that
these societal expectations about males and females and their
relative gender role differences play a fundamental role in
shaping the perceptions and framework of dyadic moral
decisions.
We further observed that these behavioral patterns are mod-
erated by the strength of the decider’s preference for harm—
but not fairness—orientations, which suggests that concern for
another’s well-being is a more salient motivator than concern
for fairness. We also reveal that male deciders’ trait sensitivity
to harm predicts altruistic behavior, while we found no support
that female deciders’ sensitivity to harm motivates altruistic
choice. Although at first glance this appears to counter the clas-
sic theory that females are more motivated by harm than their
male counterparts (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci,
1988), our data indicate that female deciders report overall
higher harm sensitivity and have lower group variance than
their male counterparts. Thus, it is possible that females may
be more constant in their endorsement of harm considerations
when navigating moral challenges, which is consistent with the
broader theory that females are strongly motivated by harm and
care orientations (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Eagly
& Wood, 1991; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). That male deci-
ders’ altruistic behavior was predicted by their trait levels of
harm sensitivity also fits with research illustrating that not only
do males exhibit greater heterogeneity in delinquency involve-
ment, but that they also engage in more antisocial behavior than
females (Moffitt & Caspi, 2001).
Here we show that both hypothetical and real moral choices
are influenced by the dyadic nature of the moral challenge. Even
when all other social and contextual factors are held constant, a
target’s gender can shift a decider’s choice to be more or less
altruistic, suggesting that gender plays a significant role in how
readily one violates the harm principle. In addition, these beha-
vioral patterns are moderated by an individual’s sensitivity to
harm but not fairness concerns. Together, these results illustrate
that moral choices are not objectively implemented but instead
are flexibly deployed relative to the individual’s moral orienta-
tions and the social context in which they are made.
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